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CHAPTER 3
Beyond Big Data Capitalism, Towards 
Dialectical Digital Modernity : Reflections 
on David Chandler’s Chapter
Christian Fuchs
1. Introduction
David Chandler’s chapter studies changes of onto-epistemology and govern-
ance in the age of digitality and Big Data. He argues that the logic of dual-
ism, reductionism, linear causation and mechanic determinism has advanced 
problems of society and is unable to give a proper response to the world’s com-
plexity. The implication is that we need a different kind of onto-epistemology 
that moves beyond dualism and enables new forms of governing society and 
the digital. David Chandler argues in this volume that the ‘ontopolitical as-
sumptions of digital governance can be usefully grasped in terms of actor net-
work theory’, and in this context he is particularly interested in Bruno Latour’s 
works and new materialist theories in general, including the works of Donna 
Haraway and others. David Chandler says that these approaches allow us 
to move beyond dualism and to conceive the world and the digital as being 
44 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
co-relational, instead of as dualistic and based on linear causality. Big Data 
would be part of new correlational machines of sensing and seeing the world 
that have resulted in new forms of digital governance focusing on co-relation 
and correlation.
David Chandler’s general approach is to search for and analyse 
onto-epistemologies that go, or claim to go, beyond dualism. He is in this context 
particularly interested in complexity theory and resilience studies. ‘[E]mergent 
or general complexity […] appears to be the leading contender as an alterna-
tive ontological vision of the world’ (Chandler 2014, 51). ‘[R]esilience-thinking 
claims to have the solution to the apparent conundrum of governing without as-
sumptions of Cartesian certainty or Newtonian necessity’ (Chandler 2014, 63).
2. (Post-)Modernity and (Post-)Modernism
I certainly agree that the dualist logic of subject/object, culture/nature, humans/ 
technology, mind/body, society/economy, communication/work, reproduction/ 
production, and so on, is a key aspect of an instrumental reason that has back-
fired and created global problems that society is not easily able to govern. But 
I am not convinced that it is theoretically feasible to term instrumental rea-
son and dualism ‘modernist binary understandings’, ‘modernist understand-
ings of the world’ or ‘modernist divisions’, and to characterise the alternative as 
‘non-modern ontologies’ and post-epistemology.
The implication of such a terminology is that the alternative to modernity 
is either premodernity or postmodernity. A premodern onto-epistemology, as 
advanced for example by Martin Heidegger, often ends up in techno-pessimism 
that rejects any form of advanced technology use. For example, Heidegger saw 
newspapers, electronic communication and public transport as inauthentic 
forms of modernism that should be abolished (see Fuchs 2015). The other op-
tion, indicated for example by the term post-epistemology, is to see the alterna-
tive in a form of postmodernity.
Questioning binaries and determinism is certainly a feature of the works of 
postmodern thinkers such as Latour, Haraway, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Derrida, 
and Deleuze and Guattari. In postmodern thought, there is a stress on chance 
instead of design, deconstruction instead of totality, absence instead of pres-
ence, networks instead of hierarchies, indeterminacy instead of determinacy, 
immanence instead of transcendence, and so on. (See Table 1.1. in Harvey 
1989, 43).
‘[B]reaking through dualism appears to be the key to new materialism’ and 
postmodern thought (Dolphin and van der Tuin 2012, 97). These approaches 
advance ‘a monist perspective’ (Dolphin and van der Tuin 2012, 85) that involves 
not only the flat ontology advocated by Chandler and others, but also what 
could be characterised as a new collapsism that collapses human/non-human, 
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society/technology, the human/the machine, class/non-class binaries into one. 
Posthumanism collapses the human and the non-human and humanoid ro-
bots into the posthuman cyborg. Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory col-
lapses technology and society into the actant as the social. Deep Ecology and 
animal liberation theory collapse nature and society into an undifferentiated 
whole. Postmodernism collapses class/non-class into identity, and culture/ 
economy into culture. The consequence is that postmodernism has not just 
tried to displace and purge Marxist humanism from the academic world over 
the past decades, but has also been the ideology of capitalism’s regime of flexible 
accumulation (Harvey 1989). There is a ‘connection between this postmodern-
ist burst and the image-making of Ronald Reagan, the attempt to deconstruct 
traditional institutions of working-class power (the trade unions and the politi-
cal parties of the left), the masking of the social effects of the economic politics 
of privilege, ought to be evident enough’ (Harvey 1989, 336). The danger of 
postmodern approaches is that proclaiming the ‘farewell to modernity’ can ad-
vance ‘counter-Enlightenment in the garb of post-Enlightenment’ (Habermas 
1990, 5).
3. Dialectical Modernity
I agree with David Chandler that we need to move beyond dualist logic and 
analyse the world as a complex, dynamic whole. But postmodern thought lacks 
the necessary power of differentiation. Modernity is not the same as capitalism, 
instrumental reason and liberalism. Assuming the identity of these phenomena 
overlooks that modernity is in itself contradictory and contains the seeds of, 
and potentials for, post-capitalism.
Modernity is the project that aims at using knowledge ‘for the pursuit of hu-
man emancipation and the enrichment of daily life’ (Harvey 1989, 12). The 
type of modernity that is based on dualism, reductionism, mechanistic causal-
ity, positivism, instrumental reason, calculability, and determinism has back-
fired as a negative dialectic of the Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno 
1944/2002) and created a history of modern catastrophes.
But modernity is not just domination from above, but also manifests through 
hegemony as domination from below as well as resistance. This resistance to 
instrumental reason does not stand outside modernity but constitutes an al-
ternative modernity. An alternative project can be based on the antagonistic 
features of modernity. Jürgen Habermas (1990) and Frederic Jameson (1991) 
agree that modernity is therefore incomplete. For Jameson (1991, 309-10), this 
means that postmodernity is more modern than modernity, whereas Haber-
mas argues for a different, alternative modern project. Critical, dialectical mo-
dernity is an alternative to capitalist, instrumental modernity. Modernity is an 
unfinished project, because it lacks certainty and finitude and always remains 
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open and developing. Modernity is always unfinished because it is an open, 
contradictory, dynamic societal formation.
I find the tradition of Hegelian and humanist Marxism a much more fea-
sible approach than postmodernism. Postmodernists have often tried to pre-
sent humanist and Hegelian Marxism as being part of the dualist tradition. But 
in reality, such versions of Marxism have advanced the onto-epistemology of 
dialectical modernity, in which categories and phenomena are identical and 
non-identical at the same time, posing a contradictory logic out of which dy-
namics, complexity and open development emerge. Hegel characterises the 
emergence of complexity and new properties as Aufhebung (sublation) taking 
place in an event, where contradictions (negations) are negated. Hegel describes 
the dialectical process as an open system of the encapsulated construction of 
triangles, so that a contradiction is sublated into a new emergent property that 
is itself part of a contradictory relation that constitutes the base of a new tri-
angle that comes about through a further sublation, and so on. ‘Something be-
comes an other, but the other is itself a something, so it likewise becomes an 
other, and so on ad infinitum’ (Hegel 1830, §93). The logic of dialectical moder-
nity is therefore complex, open and fractal in nature (see http://www.hegel.net/
en/e-poster.htm; Fuchs 2003; 2004; 2008; Fuchs and Schlemm 2005). Dialecti-
cal modernity consists of different organisational levels that are constituted by 
encapsulated dialectical triangles that develop dynamically. Each triangle is a 
dialectic of subject and object. The more one zooms into this fractal dialectic, 
the more dynamic the system is. At its inner level there is constant change. 
The more one zooms out, the more continuity you will find. This encapsulated 
triangle structure is based on a dialectic of continuity and inner change/discon-
tinuity. Human practice and praxis is the activity that produces society’s dialec-
tic and the changes at different organisational levels of this dialectic (Marcuse 
1941a). It is an unsubstantiated prejudice often labelled against Hegelianism 
and Hegelian Marxism that they advance closure and determinism. Concepts 
of complexity theory such as emergence and bifurcation points can be seen as a 
manifestation of Hegelian dialectical logic and its principles such as Aufhebung, 
the negation of the negation, and the turn from quantity into new qualities 
(Fuchs 2003; 2008).
There are different ways of overcoming dualist logic. Postmodernism is one 
way, Hegelian humanist Marxism another. The two act as dialectical conversa-
tional poles. In some cases, they sublate each other and productively fuse into 
a new emergent whole – as is the case with the book you are holding in your 
hands or reading on your screen.
The dualisms of instrumental reason are at the foundation of capitalist 
domination that in a negative dialectic again and again turns against itself 
and so destroys capitalism’s promises and produces crises and societal prob-
lems. Instrumental reason is the attempt to make society undialectical and 
one-dimensional. We never know when a major crisis will emerge, but we can 
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be certain that as long as society is based on instrumental reason, sooner or 
later such a crisis will appear (Fuchs 2004). Immanuel Wallerstein has com-
bined Marxist crisis theory and complexity theory, arguing that:
The modern world-system in which we are living, which is that of a 
capitalist world-economy, is currently in precisely such a crisis, and has 
been for a while now. This crisis may go on another twenty-five to fifty 
years. Since one central feature of such a transitional period is that we 
face wild oscillations of all those structures and processes we have come 
to know as an inherent part of the existing world-system, we find that 
our short-term expectations are necessarily quite unstable. This instabil-
ity can lead to considerable anxiety and therefore violence as people try 
to preserve acquired privileges and hierarchical rank in a very unstable 
situation. In general, this process can lead to social conflicts that take a 
quite unpleasant form (Wallerstein 2004, 77).
Wolfgang Streeck (2016) argues that the long phase of the complex world 
crisis that Wallerstein describes has resulted in a catastrophic crisis of capi-
talism. He says that capitalism’s contradictions are exploding and that the sys-
tem can no longer defer the crisis into the future by buying time. Streeck (12) 
confirms Wallerstein’s analysis that capitalism has ‘entered a period of deep 
indeterminacy – a period in which unexpected things can happen any time’. 
Streeck goes on to argue that we have entered a phase of prolonged chaos that 
he calls the interregnum – ‘no new world system equilibrium à la Wallerstein, 
but a prolonged period of social entropy, or disorder’ (13), in which social 
structures and institutions dissolve and leave society’s ‘members alone’ (36), 
and the logic of the survival of the fittest rules. Streeck’s position is in contrast 
to Wallerstein’s somewhat defeatist. He sees the logic of indeterminacy as re-
sulting in societal doom and gloom without a way out. Michael Hardt and Toni 
Negri (2017, 202) note that for Streeck ‘all antagonistic subjects capable of chal-
lenging capitalist rule have now disappeared’.
In contrast to Streeck, Wallerstein sees uncertainty as a new principle of hope 
that should motivate political movements to attempt the impossible in pursu-
ance of establishing a new system. Such optimism is based on the fact that the 
outcome of praxis is undetermined in bifurcation points and can intensify in 
unpredictable manners. Wallerstein implicitly advances a new notion of praxis 
that operates on the basis of relative chance, dialectical logic, and dialectical 
indeterminancy. ‘The period of transition from one system to another is a pe-
riod of great struggle, of great uncertainty, and of great questioning about the 
structures of knowledge. […] And we must finally figure out how we can act in 
the present so that it is likely to go in the direction we prefer’ (Wallerstein 2004, 
89–90). Praxis faces uncertainty, but it is also the attempt to increase the likeli-
hood of certain preferable options at bifurcation points.
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4. Big Data Capitalism’s Solutionism
Computing is embedded into the crises that have emerged from capitalism’s 
contradictions. And arguably, it has to some degree made the occurrence of 
crises and catastrophes even more likely. Algorithmic trading, for example, has 
intensified the likelihood of financial crises. Together with the general logic 
of fictitious capital underpinning financial derivatives, it has made financial 
markets more unpredictable. User-generated fake news and fake online atten-
tion are forms of a semi-automatic online politics that uses social media bots 
and artificial intelligence. In the world of Big Data, it has become more difficult 
to discern which actions are initiated by humans and which by bots and algo-
rithms. The conjunction of algorithmic politics and right-wing extremist ideol-
ogy has increased the uncertainty and unpredictability of politics. Not many 
people thought that Donald Trump would become US president, but the polls’ 
models of prediction failed: it was precisely this conjunction that won Trump 
the election (Fuchs 2018).
Big Data has not moved us towards dialectical modernity, but has rather 
tended to deepen the logic of mechanic determinism, reductionism and dual-
ism, and the division of mental and manual labour that Alfred Sohn-Rethel 
(1978) considers characteristic of class societies, particularly capitalist ones. 
In contemporary capitalism, Big Data has been embedded into what Evgeny 
Morozov (2013) calls technological solutionism. Digital solutionism is based 
on the logic to save everything, click here. It assumes that digital technologies 
make society completely controllable, steerable and governable, and therefore 
provide a fix for global problems, economic and political crises, terrorism, 
crime and so forth.
The logic of technological solutionism is not new. It is a capitalist logic that 
Horkheimer (2004) called instrumental reason and Marcuse (1941b) techno-
logical rationality. Digital solutionism intensified and accelerated after the 9/11 
attacks. Unable to respond to political complexity, governments advanced the 
solutionist ideology that large-scale data and online surveillance can predict, 
prevent and control terrorism and organised crime. The logic of determinism 
was thereby further extended and intensified. The surveillance society com-
bines surveillance ideology, the surveillance state and surveillance capitalism 
(Trottier and Fuchs 2015). The rise of Big Data has added a new dimension to 
digital solutionism, advancing Big Data solutionism, which is the idea that Big 
Data sets can control, solve and overcome economic and political crises. Big 
Data capitalism does not overcome, but instead deepens the logic of dualism, 
determinism and linearity. It is an intensification of instrumental reason that 
has created new qualities of domination and exploitation. So for example, ‘tech-
niques and ideologies of Big Data make another appearance, promising that a 
greater, deeper analysis of data about past crimes, combined with sophisticated 
algorithms, can predict – and prevent – future ones. This is a practice known 
as “predictive policing”, and even though it is just a few years old, many tout 
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it as a revolution in how police work is done. It is the epitome of solutionism’ 
(Morozov 2013, 182).
David Chandler hints at such a critique of Big Data solutionism when at the 
very end of his chapter he argues, drawing on Giorgio Agamben, that digital and 
Big Data governance can ‘be seen to be thoroughly depoliticizing, as the tasks 
of governance are discursively derived “empirically” from the world, rather than 
from human actors as subjects’. The end of the story turns back against the main 
thread of the story, which in a discursive logic typical for David’s writings, creates 
an openness and uncertainty regarding the whole story itself.
5. Towards Dialectical Digital Modernity
The escalation of the antagonisms inherent in capitalism’s instrumental reason 
has intensified the complexity, unpredictability and uncertainty of societal de-
velopment. This phase of the deep economic, political and legitimation crisis 
coincides with the rise of Big Data capitalism. Big Data technologies promise 
to create certainty in a highly uncertain world, yet through their logic of digital 
solutionism they exacerbate the crises. But pointing this out does not mean 
that we should abolish digital technologies and revert to pre-modern technolo-
gies. It is also no way forward to try to create radically new postmodern technolo-
gies that completely break with the technologies we have. The digital technologies 
we have are internally antagonistic. They advance solutionism and domination, 
yet at the same time they contain new potentials for cooperation and liberation. 
The point is that capitalism, class, power structures, domination and exploitation 
have never allowed society and technology to become fully dialectical.
Again and again, modernity turns against itself and destroys its own poten-
tials, calling forth catastrophes and crises. The point is then to shape technol-
ogy and society differently and dialectically, so that digital objects and digital 
subjects are no longer separated but, based on the logic of dialectical moder-
nity, form a differentiated, complex unity in diversity. Our societal and digital 
future is uncertain. But this does not mean that technology can determine or 
compute the future. That society is complex, dynamic, open, non-linear, un-
predictable and dialectical is an impetus for praxis as political hope that aims 
at transforming the whole by perpetuating the system and trying to increase 
the likelihood of certain potential development paths of our societal and digital 
future. Such a future is not pre- or postmodern, but an alternative, dialectical 
(digital) modernity that realises its own potentials. It is the revolt against capi-
talism in general, and the transcendence and sublation of digital capitalism in 
particular. Such a society will also transform and sublate today’s digital tech-
nologies, which means that it will abolish destructive technologies and tech-
nological qualities, preserve technologies of cooperation, reconstruct existing 
technologies and create new dialectical technologies that transcend the logic of 
instrumental reason.
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